講座題目：Misforecasting Earnings: Management Expectations and Capital Market Anomalies

講座時(shí)間：2023年4月10日 12點(diǎn)20-13：20

講座地點(diǎn)：博學(xué)樓925

主講人：周德馨現(xiàn)任紐約市立大學(xué)巴魯克學(xué)院經(jīng)濟(jì)與金融系副教授。他的主要研究領(lǐng)域?yàn)槊襟w，社交網(wǎng)絡(luò)，以及機(jī)構(gòu)投資者在金融市場(chǎng)中的作用。他的研究成果曾發(fā)表于國(guó)際頂級(jí)金融和會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)期刊，包括Journal of Financial Economics, Review of Financial Studies以及 Accounting Review，并被《華爾街日?qǐng)?bào)》，《經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)人》，《金融時(shí)報(bào)》，以及《哈佛法學(xué)院公司治理論壇》等國(guó)際知名媒體引用。他于巴德學(xué)院獲得數(shù)學(xué)學(xué)士學(xué)位，并從艾默里大學(xué)獲得金融學(xué)博士學(xué)位。

主講人學(xué)術(shù)觀點(diǎn)：研究興趣為行為金融學(xué)，了解投資者行為偏差對(duì)投資資產(chǎn)組合以及資產(chǎn)價(jià)格的影響。

講座簡(jiǎn)介：We investigate whether management earnings forecasts reflect the biases captured by anomaly signals and subsequent implications for capital market efficiency. We discover that management earnings forecasts are more pessimistic for stocks that are undervalued based on anomaly signals, suggesting anomaly signals capture biases in managers' forecasts. Furthermore, the biases in management forecasts are more severe than those in analyst forecasts. The findings are stronger when managers are overconfident and when they make long-term forecasts, and during high sentiment periods, but not influenced by the trading activities of insiders or firms. This suggests that behavioral issues, rather than strategic manipulation, drive the biases in management forecasts. Moreover, the biases in management forecasts are predominantly captured by underreaction and short-term anomalies. Finally, anomaly returns are significantly amplified and prolonged when managers issue forecasts that are inconsistent with the anomaly signals, suggesting these forecasts exacerbate the errors in investor expectation of future cash flowing.