講座題目：Trading Away Incentives

講座時(shí)間：2023年4月7日（周五）12：20-13：20

講座方式：學(xué)術(shù)午餐會(huì)

講座地址： 博學(xué)樓925

主講人：夏爍，萊比錫大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理學(xué)院助理教授，哈勒經(jīng)濟(jì)研究所研究員，鹿特丹伊拉斯姆斯大學(xué)金融學(xué)博士。研究專長(zhǎng)為高管薪酬，公司治理與公司財(cái)務(wù)。側(cè)重從資本市場(chǎng)，高技術(shù)人才流動(dòng)等角度分析公司治理與公司運(yùn)營(yíng)決策。

主講人學(xué)術(shù)觀點(diǎn)：研究興趣為高管薪酬，公司治理與公司財(cái)務(wù)。側(cè)重從資本市場(chǎng)，高技術(shù)人力資源等角度分析公司治理與公司運(yùn)營(yíng)決策。

講座簡(jiǎn)介：Equity pay has been the primary component of managerial compensation packages at US public firms since the early 1990s. Using a comprehensive sample of top executives from 1992-2020, we estimate to what extent they trade firm equity held in their portfolios to neutralize increments in ownership due to annual equity grants. Executives accommodate ownership increases linked to options awards. Conversely, increases in stock holdings linked to option exercises and restricted stock grants are largely neutralized through comparable sales of unrestricted shares. Variation in stock trading responses across executives hardly appears to respond to diversification motives. From a theoretical standpoint, these results challenge (i) the common, generally implicit assumption that managers cannot undo their incentive packages, (ii) the standard modeling practice of treating different equity pay items homogeneously, and (iii) the often taken for granted crucial role of diversification motives in managers’ portfolio choices.