學(xué)術(shù)講座：Dynamic Runs and Optimal Termination

金融學(xué)院SBF論壇2019年第18講

講座題目： Dynamic Runs and Optimal Termination

時間：5月30日（周四） 12：20-13：30

地點：博學(xué)樓925

主講人：周臻

主講人簡介：

周臻，2016年博士畢業(yè)于紐約大學(xué)，現(xiàn)任清華大學(xué)五道口金融學(xué)院助理教授。他的主要研究領(lǐng)域為金融經(jīng)濟學(xué)，信息經(jīng)濟學(xué)，金融危機以及金融監(jiān)管。周臻教授曾在諸多頂尖院校及會議宣講論文，他的工作論文“Diffusing Coordination Risk”現(xiàn)在在AER進行2nd round RR.

講座內(nèi)容簡介：

Abstract：Investors may fail to coordinate and run on distressed firms, which often forces those firms to terminate. How can firms design termination rules to promote coordination among investors? To address this question, we build a dynamic coordination model in which investors learn about a hidden bad shock in an asynchronous manner and then decide when to withdraw capital. The firm in the model can choose the termination threshold and clawback payments made to investors who withdraw within a certain window prior to its termination. Surprisingly, the firm can survive longer if it commits to terminate while there are still assets left for the remaining investors, because a higher termination payoff alleviates investors' ex-ante incentives to run. We analytically characterize the optimal clawback window and show that it should not be excessively long. A longer clawback window lowers the chance for an investor to exit the firm successfully, and therefore may lead investors to leave sooner.