講座題目:Financial Reporting Quality and Myopic Investments: Theory and Evidence
講座時(shí)間:2022年12月9日(星期五)上午9:00-10:00
講座方式:騰訊會(huì)議ID:110-608-784
密碼:221209
講座鏈接:https://meeting.tencent.com/dm/o9GSrtdlS7UJ
主講人
張程,新西蘭惠靈頓維多利亞大學(xué)金融學(xué)助理教授,于倫敦政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院獲金融學(xué)博士。研究領(lǐng)域?yàn)檠苌?、?cái)務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)、信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)、投資學(xué)。成果發(fā)表于Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Journal of Futures Markets等期刊。
Dr. Cheng Zhang is an Assistant Professor of Finance at the School of Economics and Finance, Victoria University of Wellington. Dr. Zhang received her Ph.D. in Finance from the London School of Economics in 2017. Her research interests include derivatives, financial reporting, information economics, and investments. Her work has been published in the Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis and the Journal of Futures Markets.
作者:Heng Geng Victoria University of Wellington Cheng Zhang Victoria University of Wellington - Te Herenga Waka Frank Zhou University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School
講座簡介:We present theory and empirical evidence that greater financial reporting quality can incentivize myopic investments. In the model, greater financial reporting quality increases investor response to earnings and, in turn, the importance of earnings for the manager, elevating her incentive to invest myopically to improve earnings. Using the setting of Big N auditors’ acquisitions of non-Big Ns, which increased investor response to earnings for the acquired client firms, we find evidence supporting myopic investments. Specifically, acquired clients decrease intangible investments, particularly when (i) the increase in investor response to earnings is larger and (ii) the horizon of shareholders is shorter. The investment decrease is inefficient, as evidenced by reduced profitability, fewer exploratory innovations, and other measures.
關(guān)鍵詞:Financial reporting quality; Earnings response coefficient; Measurements; Myopia; Intangible investments; Patents; Real effects; Innovations