講座題目：Political Connection and Corporate Litigation: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment

時間：2021年6月25日（周五）12:00– 13:00 博學(xué)925

主講人: 田思楊 西南財經(jīng)大學(xué)會計學(xué)院助理教授

主講人簡介：

田思楊，金融學(xué)博士，畢業(yè)于倫敦城市大學(xué)卡斯商學(xué)院，于2019年入職西南財經(jīng)大學(xué)會計學(xué)院擔任助理教授，從事公司金融研究，包括：并購、風投/私募、公司治理，信息披露等方向。曾先后赴多倫多大學(xué)Rotman管理學(xué)院、華盛頓大學(xué)Foster商學(xué)院、清華大學(xué)經(jīng)管學(xué)院訪學(xué)。在職期間，擔任公司財務(wù)理論（博士）、投資學(xué)、以及高級財務(wù)會計等課程的任課老師。

講座內(nèi)容簡介：

This paper exploits China’s recent anti-corruption campaign to study the effects of political connection on corporate litigation. Specifically, by exploiting the enforcement of an important component of the campaign, the Communist Party of China’s Rule 18 which forces politically connected independent directors to resign from public firms, we investigate how acquired protection from political connection may distort corporate litigation. We show that the weakening of political connection results in higher likelihood of and larger amount involved in corporate litigation against connected firms. Such effects are more pronounced for non-state-owned enterprises, financially distressed firms, and firms in regions with worse legal institutions. We also find that cases with severe information asymmetry are a crucial driving force of the effects. Finally, additional tests suggest that disconnection is associated with higher win rates of plaintiffs and more negative market reactions to corporate litigation.