學(xué)術(shù)信息
學(xué)術(shù)講座：Unobserved Ties between Corporate Executives and Mutual Fund Managers
日期：2017-05-25 | 訪問(wèn)量：
學(xué)術(shù)講座：Unobserved Ties between Corporate Executives and Mutual Fund Managers
學(xué)術(shù)講座：Unobserved Ties between Corporate Executives and Mutual Fund Managers 時(shí)間：2017-6-2 15:00-16:30 地點(diǎn)：博學(xué)918 主講人簡(jiǎn)介： 凌崚博士，美國(guó)Georgia College & State University金融學(xué)終身副教授。研究領(lǐng)域有機(jī)構(gòu)投資者，共同基金，和公司金融等。1995年獲 武漢大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)學(xué)士 (國(guó)際金融)學(xué)位，2002年獲美國(guó)Georgia State University(佐治亞州立大學(xué))工商管理碩士(金融學(xué)) 學(xué)位，2008年獲Georgia State University博士(金融學(xué)) 學(xué)位。所著論文發(fā)表在The Review of Financial Studies, The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Journal of Financial Markets, Finance Research Letters 等多家國(guó)外學(xué)術(shù)期刊。擔(dān)任Financial Review, Journal of Economics and Business，F(xiàn)inance Research Letters 的匿名審稿人。 摘要： We examine investment decisions made by mutual fund managers following the removal of corporate executives from an origin firm for positions at a new destination firm. Our results indicate that managerial turnover causes some funds to comigrate, i.e., divesting in the origin firm while initiating investments in the destination firm. This phenomenon is more pronounced for funds that have earned superior returns from the investments in the origin firm, and that have a greater demand for additional sources of information regarding the destination firm. Further, compared to the holding changes of non-comigration funds, the holding changes of comigration funds in the destination firm have more explanatory power for stock performance around earnings announcement dates. We found no evidence, however, that managers of co-migration funds have better investment skills than non-comigrating managers. Our findings indicate that institutional investors.