學(xué)術(shù)講座：China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign and Credit Reallocation from SOEs to Non-SOEs

金融學(xué)院SBF論壇2019年第6講

講座題目：China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign and Credit Reallocation from SOEs to Non-SOEs

時(shí)間：2019年3月28日（周四）12:20-13:30

地點(diǎn)：博學(xué)樓925

主講人：李波

主講人簡(jiǎn)介：

李波，清華大學(xué)五道口金融學(xué)院助理教授。2013年畢業(yè)于加拿大女王大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)系，獲經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)博士學(xué)位；2006年獲得不列顛哥倫比亞大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)碩士學(xué)位。研究領(lǐng)域?yàn)楣窘鹑?、政治?jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)和企業(yè)破產(chǎn)等，并在Journal of Finance, Law, and Accounting等期刊上發(fā)表論文。

講座內(nèi)容簡(jiǎn)介：

We provide a novel empirical finding that the recent anti-corruption investigations in China are associated with credit reallocation from less productive, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to more productive, non-SOEs. The empirical strategy exploits staggered investigations as exogenous shocks to bank loan issuance among rival firms in affected industry. The main finding extends to implicated firms and non-affected industries, proves strong for extensive margins and a supply shock, and remains solid for stock market reactions. We further single out the economic efficiency channel, and to a lesser extent, the political connection channel, through which the anti-corruption campaign leads to improved credit reallocation.