學(xué)術(shù)講座：公司債券市場(chǎng)中的信任：來(lái)自法律訴訟的證據(jù)

摘要：本文采用法律訴訟作為公司可信度的外部沖擊，分析法律、市場(chǎng)力量和社會(huì)資本如何影響發(fā)行者的公共債務(wù)的特征。相比于傾向性匹配類(lèi)似的發(fā)行者，陷入訴訟的發(fā)行者所發(fā)行的投資級(jí)債券有更高的收益（4.9%），更短的期限（11個(gè)月），和更小的發(fā)行規(guī)模（1470億美元）。當(dāng)發(fā)行者是被告或者敗訴，或當(dāng)發(fā)行者的關(guān)系圈更緊密時(shí)，或當(dāng)發(fā)行者總位于在存在高度信任的區(qū)域，這種約束效應(yīng)會(huì)更強(qiáng)；而發(fā)行者的政治資本和承銷(xiāo)方的市場(chǎng)力量會(huì)弱化這種效應(yīng)。事件研究顯示在訴訟宣布周?chē)酗@著為負(fù)的債券異?；貓?bào)和過(guò)度交易?？偟膩?lái)說(shuō)，本文揭示了信任如何塑造貸款合約的基礎(chǔ)，和公共債權(quán)人在約束經(jīng)理方面的正面影響。
Abstract: Using lawsuits as shock to firms’ trustworthiness, this paper examines how laws, market forces, and social capital affect issuers’ public debt properties. All else equal, investment grade bonds of litigated issuers have 4.9% higher yield spread, 11-month shorter maturity, and $14.7 million less issuance volume than propensity score matched bonds of non-litigated issuers. The tightening effect is more pronounced when issuers were defendants or lost the case, when issuers’ relationship circle is close-knit, or headquartered in high trust regions, and moderated by issuers’ political capital and the market power of their underwriters. Event study reports significantly negative abnormal bond return and excess trading volume around lawsuit announcements. Taken together, this paper uncovers the building blocks of trust in shaping loan contracts, and the positive role of public debt holders in constraining managers.