7月2日SBF論壇：Structural Investigation of Acquiring Ma

金融學院SBF論壇：

題目：Structural

Investigation of Acquiring Managers'Incentives

in Takeovers

 

演講人：李荻 博士/助理教授（Georgia State University）

地點：博學樓715

時間： 2013年 7月 2日 （周二）16:00-17:30

 

演講人簡介：李荻，密歇根大學（Ann Arbor）Stephen M. Ross 商學院 金融學 博士，佐治亞州立大學J.

Mack Robinson商學院助理教授，研究領(lǐng)域為并購、公司金融、資產(chǎn)定價、結(jié)構(gòu)性計量方法，已在SSCI國際頂級期刊Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis發(fā)表論文。

 

講座摘要：This research quantifies the

degree of agency conflicts in acquiring firms. By estimating managerial

valuations using a structural method and calculating shareholder valuations

from stock market reactions to takeovers, I find that acquiring managers

overvalue targets by 63% of target capitalization. As a result, acquiring

managers pick targets that provide no synergy gains in 17% of takeovers and

overbid by 13% of target capitalization in the rest. Private benefits sought by

acquiring managers amount to $9 million on average and vary substantially

across firms. Agency problems are more severe for larger bidders that have

greater free cash flows and chase larger targets. However, an independent board

can reduce private benefits and mitigate agency problems for acquiring

firms. 

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